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INSURANCE AND INDEMNIFICATION IMPLICATIONS
OF FUTURE SPACE PROJECTS
John E. O'Brien
General Counsel
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
As we are all acutely aware, the international insurance
industry has suffered substantial losses in the casualty
insurance arena in the past several years.
Some of those
losses, but certainly not all, have been attributable to
certain space activities undertaken by members of the
international community.
In addition, many of the insurance
problems also involve the extraordinary number of aircraft
accidents and other casualty losses associated with product
liability and related liability payouts which have occurred
within a relatively short period of time.
As a result, the allocation of risks between manufacturers of
various technologies, the users and consumers of such
technologies, and the insurers and re-insurers of such
ventures, have resulted in a real or perceived imbalance of
risk-taking to the apparent detriment of the insurers at this
particular point in time.
The reasons for this are, to be
sure, complex.
One thing is probably certain, however, and
that is the global insurance community is exasperated at being
the risk takers of last resort when it comes to what perhaps
should by now be routine space activities.
It is easy to be
very sympathetic with this exasperation, but we must also keep
in perspective that this is the nature of the insurance
business.
There are good times and bad.
The pendulum of
insurance underwriting history, which is never in complete
equilibrium, appears to have swung in the direction of bad
times for the space insurance industry.
We all hope that the
pendulum will swing back in favor of good times soon.
Although we amateurs in the insurance world may be prone tci
panic under current conditions, I venture to speculate that the
professionals in the business know precisely the situation they
face and, importantly, have innovative and productive _ideas on
how to recover from the current unfavorable circumstances.
It
may take a little time, I don't profess to know how long, for
these ideas to surface and take recognizable form.
However, it
is my belief that they will emerge in time and I think it would
behoove us all to allow this to germinate.
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As we attempt to chart a course for the future we should resist
the temptation to allow present problems to force us into
near-term solutions which compromise or make more difficult
long-term planning for successful space ventures.
There is a
very definite place for the international insurance community
in space exploration.
However, space science and technology
move rapidly, and the insurance industry must learn to adjust
rapidly as well.
Bold vision and leadership are needed, and
some risks the industry would prefer not to take might have to
be taken in order to capitalize on the intense future
commercial uses of outer space which are sure to come.
Perhaps
11
David Lloyd George said it best:
Don 1 t be afraid to take a
big step.
You can't cross a chasm in two small jumps. 11
Let's keep in mind where we are in this point of recorded
history.
Only fifty years ago Charles Lindbergh ordered an
airplane from the British firm Phillips and Powis, Ltd., to his
own specifications.
The plane was a Miles Mohawk reported by a
magazine of the time to be "a well-equipped private machine for
long-distance travel" and "powered by a Menasco Buccaneer,
supercharged to 250 h.p., for fast high-level cruising."
Also,
only fifty years ago, Dr. Robert H. Goddard launched a
four-chambered liquid propellant rocket to an altitude of 200
feet at Roswell, New Mexico.
I wo~der if these gentlemen and
other pioneers like them ever considered the liability and
insurance consequences of their work.
Like it or not, there
are profound social consequences which flow from technological
advancement.
At the dawn of the Space Age three decades ago, who could have
foreseen that in 1987 some 125 nations would be involved in
space-related activities? Who could have foreseen the
development of independent space launch capabilities in Europe
as well as in Japan, China, and India in addition to the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R.? The point is that the momentum toward more
and mare space ventures is crystal clear.
Just how the
worldwide insurance industry can harness this momentum to its
advantage is a major challenge.
I salute their courage in
undertaking the difficult task of finding solutions which are
workable and satisfying.
At the same time, I would caution
them once again to avoid near-term solutions to current ills
which might compromise the promise of the future.
To provide an appropriate foundation for my discussion of
options we at NASA have under consideration regarding our
insurance and indemnification policies, as they relate to our
customers and contractors, I would like to cover how NASA is
planning to return the Space Shuttle fleet to safe flight as
well as current U.S. policy regarding future uses of the
Shuttle fleet.
As we are all aware, prior to the Challenger accident the Space
Shuttle had provided a versatile, cost-effective, and
relatively risk-free access to outer space.
The demonstrated
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ability of the Shuttle and its crews to accomplish on-orbit
repairs and to retrieve and return payloads to earth was truly
outstanding and had obvious insurance implications.
At the
time of the accident, we were well into demonstrating
construction techniques in space using the Shuttle as the test
platform.
The promise for the future utilizing skills that
only humans can bring with them to space was clearly there.
It
still is as we prepare to return to manned space flight.
We are engagsd in a massive effort to get flying again.
The
recommendations of the Presidential Commission which
investigated the accident together with the NASA response have
resulted in a far-ranging review of many aspects of the Shuttle
program.
The obvious immediate technical effort surrounds the
redesign of the solid rocket motor joints and testing the
redesign.
Not so obvious, perhaps, is the parallel effort
engaged in reviewing all critical items in the overall system,
the main engines, and operational procedures.
The design of
the entire system is being reviewed as well as the mission
rules and even personnel training.
There is a pi-esent emphasis
on safety considerations which is very intense and permeates
all aspects of our planning for return to flight.
On October 3, 1986, the NASA Administrator announced that we
would launch again on February 18, 1988.
There is nothing
magic about this date, but it does represent our assessment of
where our conserv~tive recovery program is taking us.
Right
now, of course, the pacing activity is the SRM redesign, test,
manufacture, and qualification.
If all goes as expected,
February 18, 1988, may well be a good launch date.
However, it
should be very clear that safety of flight will dominate this
and all launch decisions.
This philosophy also has obvious
insurance implications.
While the technical replanning has been proceeding, we also
have concurrently reexamined the·management struct~re of the
Shuttle program.
A new structure has been put in place which,
we believe, will greatly strengthen the management control over
the program.
Whereas, previously the program had been largely
managed at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, we now have a
pro gram d i ~- e c to r i n Wash i n g ton w i th d i rec t au.tho r i t y over a 1 1
aspects of the program.
It will be a strong management
structure not unlike the one we had in place during the Apollo
program.
Unfortunate as the Challenger accident was, the
resulting long "down time" has provided us with the opportunity
to perform an in-depth technical and management review of all
aspects of the program.
We have seized upon the opportunity,
and we are firmly dedicated to returning the world's premier
space vehicle to safe and reliable flight status in 1988.
As we return to flight status, there will be a different look
insofar as the future use of the Shuttle fleet in concerned.
Our manifest includes evidence of a significant U.S. policy
redirection.
This redirection in the near term is the result
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of a four-orbiter fleet suddenly and unexpectedly becoming a
three-orbiter fleet and of a reduced flight rate for each
available orbiter.
But in the far term, the redirection
evidences a reinvigorated poljcy initiative to draw the U.S.
private sector into the commercial launch business.
The change in direction was signalled by Pr~sident Reagan on
August 15, 1986.
On that date, he made the all-important
announcement that the U.S. would build a replacement orbiter
for the Challenger.
But he also began a fundamental
redirection regarding the use of the Shuttle fleet when he
announced that NASA would no longer be in the business of
launching private satellites and that the U.S. private sector
would play an increasingly important role in the Americari space
effort.
Henceforth, NASA and the Shuttle fleet would be
dedicated to payloads important to national security and
foreign policy as well as exploration. pioneering, and
developing new technologies and uses of space.
With the overall policy direction established by the President
last August, the focus of attention shifted to the Shuttle
man i fest t o s r: e w h 1 ch pay 1 o ad r,::; lrJ c.11.1 1 ci be t- l own and when .
There
were many comple>( issues involved.
Because of the Challengelacc i dent and other Pxpenciab 1 e 1 aunch veh i c 1 e fa i 1 ur-es. we have
a large backloq of U.S. national security and scientific
payloads which need early attention.
Also, it is anticipated
that the first Space Station launches will begin in 1993 and
continue thereafter at a steady rate.
In addition, because
there will be a reduced flight rate for several years, space
availab]e on the Shuttle betweerl 1988 and 1993 and beyond will
be at a premium.
The chore of setting priorities on the manifest was extremely
difficult and involved a number of Government agencies.
What
emerged was a policy that the only commercial and foreiqn
payloads that the Shuttle would carry in the future would be
those that are Shuttle-unique or have national security or
foreign policy implications.
This, in turn, meant that the
Shuttle manifest had to meld U.S. national security missions,
U.S. scientific missions, Shuttle-unique payloads, and
commercial and foreign payloads that had national security or
foreign policy implications.
The manifest which finally
emerged represents an equitable balance of the competing
interests within the new policy constraints.
One consequence,
of course, is that commercial and foreign payloads which are
not Shuttle-unique nor have national security or foreign policy
implications are ineligible for future Shuttle launches.
Also,
those payloads that were covered by launch services agreements
with NASA but which are not on the manifest cannot be
accommodated prior to the expiration at their agreements due to
the reduced flight rate and the priorities established as a
consequence of the Challenger accident.
The expectation is
that the ineligible and unaccommodated payloads will gravitate
to U.S. private expendable launch vehicles, thereby furthering

9-4

another Presidential policy goal.
Whether and to what extent
this goal will be realized remains to be seen.
When the Shuttle manifest was announced by the NASA
Administrator on October 3, 1986, he pointed out that, through
1994, 41 percent of the Shuttle capability will fill the needs
of the Department of Defense; 47 percent will fill NASA's
needs; and 12 percent will be allocated to commercial, foreign
government, and other U.S. Government civil space needs.
So
then, this is our "new look" for the foreseeable future.
What
are the implications for the insurance industry? As a result
of the policy changes, will NASA now lose interest in insurance
matters? Not at all.
We not only have those customers who are
on the current manifest to be concerned about, but we will also
continue to fly Shuttle-unique payloads and those having
national security or foreign policy implications.
In addition,
we will always have our NASA contractors and subcontractors
involved in Shuttle launch and mission operations.
Our normal
concerns and involvement with insurance and indemnification
issues will continue without abatement.
Let me share some of our current thinking on these matters.
We
continue to be very concerned about the continuity, capacity,
and cost of sp~ce-related insurance.
We are sympathetic toward
the industry and its recent proble~s, and we appreciate the
fact that risk management from the industry's viewpoint really
turns out to be ·1argely unmanageable due to forces beyond its
control.
We are also confident that they know their business
better than anyone else and are best equipped to manage their
way out of their problems.
However, we at NASA are in the
space exploration business, and we can't afford to let
insurance problems frustrate the accomplishment of our
important missions.
NASA has the means to solve most of its
insurance problems, but in so doing we may further exacerbate
the insurance industry's problems.
I will try and explain what we are thinking by categories of
activity.
With regard to property damage or destruction, NASA
has long had a policy whereby all Shuttle users, including the
U.S. Government, must agi-ee to an interparty, no subrogation,
cross-waiver as a condition of flight.
Under this policy, each
party agrees not to bring an action against any other party on
the same flight for loss of or damage to property on the flight
no matter whose fault it is.
We intend to continue this policy
on future Shuttle flights.
This will continue to minimize the
risk ,for Shuttle users but doesn't help a user decide whether
to self-insure.
NASA can't solve that problem, but hopefully
the insurance industry can.
We have gone as far as we can with
our cross-waiver policy.
On the other hand, insurance against liability to third parties
presents an entirely different array of possible NASA options.
Before listing them, let me state that NASA does not want to go
into the insurance business.
But, we will if we believe it is
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necessary under the circumstances in order to further the
exploration of outer space.
Our current policy is to require
our customers to carry up to $500 million worth of third party
liability insurance, naming the U.S. Government as an insured
party, over and above which the U.S. indemnifies the customer
against liability.
One of our options is to retain this
policy; however, this may be somewhat unrealistic given the
current state of capacity and premium cost.
A realistic view of the current situation leads quickly to
another option which is to reduce the scope of the risk to be
insured.
There are several aspects of this.
The obvious
reduction would be to reduce the $500 million requirement to
somewhere between $100 and $300 million and hope the
·
accompanying premiums would be customer-palatable.
Other
associated reductions we have under consideration include the
exclusion of the U.S. Government as a named insured while the
payload is still in the Shuttle bay, as well as after
deployment, and the elimination of the continuing insurance
requirement for payloads in geostationary orbit.
Another option would be to eliminate the insurance requirement
altogether.
However, this probably would not be very
practical.
Not many enterprises would be willing to "bet the
company" although large institutions might be willing to absorb
the risk in lieu of insurance.
An offshoot of this might
involve some combination of customer self-insurance and NASA
indemnification.
In other words, the customer would agree to
self-insure up to an agreed level of coverage and NASA would
indemnify the customer against third party liability above that
level.
In such a case, NASA would require that customer assets
be encumbered in some way for some period of time against the
possibility of a liability payout.
Other options would put NASA in the insurance business.
Under
section 308 of the Space Act, NASA has the authority to provide
liability insurance for Shuttle users and charge a premium.
We
have never done this and don't desire to, but we can.
There
are at least four interesting possibilities here.
The first
would be to allow a user to purchase a first layer of coverage
from NASA, purchase a second layer commercially, and then NASA
would indemnify the user above the second layer at no charge.
This would be an "insurance sandwich."
An alternate "sandwich"
would be to reverse the first two layers; i.e., the user would
purchase the first layer commercially, the second layer from
NASA, and NASA would again indemnify over and above the second
layer at no charge.
The third possibility might be a sharing arrangement whereby
the user and NASA share each dollar of liability in the first
layer, or perhaps any layer, and NASA would charge the user a
premium based on the sharing arrangement.
Finally, NASA could
indemnify a user against all third party liability and charge
the user an appropriate fee.
The point here is that NASA has
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options available to ease insurance-related impediments to
access to space.
We don't want to compete with the insurance
industry nor deprive it or a business base, but we might have
to should access to space become jeopardized due to an
insurance crisis.
That brings me to the last topic for this paper--NASA
contractors and subcontractors involved in Shuttle operations.
The problem here is relatively simple and straightforward.
It
involves the pass-through of premiums charged our contractors
for third party liability insurance to the U.S. Government.
Under our contracts, these· costs are reimbursable by NASA to
our contractors.
In other words, NASA has been paying large
sums to the insurance industry for coverage related to Shuttle
operations. This was not a problem for NASA until large premium
increases began arriving without explanation and without any
apparent connection to liability or increased risk.
It became
intolerable, and we concluded that we could better use our
limited financial resources for program purposes.
In 1984 we
began to indemnify some our contractors totally or partially
against third party liability which might arise during.Shuttle
operations.
For example, we indemnify Rockwell and Lockheed from the first
dollar and others above specified amounts.
We are now getting
more and more pressure to extend indemnification to other
contractors and subcontractors since the Challenger accident.
The point is that NASA is saving millions of dollars in premium
expenses we would otherwise be paying through our contractors
to the insurance industry.
That's good news for NASA; however,
this removes hundreds of millions of dollars from the premium
base of the insurance industry.
We would be happy to reexamine the way this is going if the
industry would come up with some plan for getting Shuttle
operations insurance under some reasonable control.
There has
been talk for years about establishing contractor pools to
share the risk on a broad basis with some combination of
insurance and NASA indemnification; but nothing ever
materializes.
We would be pleased to work with the insurance
and contractor communities if appropriate representatives or
groups of representatives could be identified to us.
We have
some time to work on this before the next Shuttle launch but
time is rapidly running ou·t.
NASA can't pull this together on
its own; we are not equipped to do so.
We will help to the
extent that we can, but if things don't start to get better we
will resort to one of the most basic, time-honored principles
of human behavior--self help.
And don't forget--the Space
Station is coming!
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